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1.1 Parliaments and diversity 
Politicians and policy makers across the globe increasingly devote attention to the socio-
demographic representativeness of political institutions. The under-representation of specific 
groups is increasingly seen as a democratic problem of justice, legitimacy, responsiveness and 
effectiveness (Phillips 1995). Institutions and political parties facilitate – at least in their 
discourses - the influx of descriptive representatives from under-represented groups. Parity 
laws and quotas have been applied in progressively more countries to break through barriers 
hindering women’s formal and descriptive participation (Krook 2009). The under-
representation of other groups, especially ethnic minorities, is also problematised (Bird 2004). 
To counter the lack of representativeness of political institutions and policy making on a 
substantive level, gender and equality mainstreaming policies are implemented and networks 
and committees for group representation such as women’s policy agencies, parliamentary 
committees for gender and diversity, etc. are installed (Outshoorn & Kantola, 2007). Besides 
the implementation of such policies and policy bodies, the presence of members of 
marginalised groups in politics, and more precisely in parliaments, is also considered a means 
to reach better substantive representation of groups like women and minorities.  
Nevertheless, the rich neo-institutionalist literature urges us to not overstress the capacity of 
individual actors to produce change since institutions like parliaments have a strong tendency 
towards stability and conservation. Feminist historical institutionalism stresses that the 
possibility for gender change, such as an increase in the descriptive and substantive 
representation of women, is defined and confined by path dependency of the institutional 
arena (Waylen 2009). Sociological institutionalism contends that the behaviour of actors is 
constrained by institutions and is a result of the interaction between formal and informal rules, 
practices and 'the way of doing things’, reflecting norms, cognitive frames and the wider 
cultural context (Mackay et al. 2009; Mackay & Meier 2003). Newcomer MPs acquire 
existing “values, skills, loyalties and cognitive maps” through processes of political 
socialisation (Almond & Verba 1963: 29-30), both prior to and after entering parliament. 
MP’s personal ambitions and goals are filtered and transformed by formal and informal 
institutional expectations and demands, resulting in attitudes and expectations fitting the 
performance of specific legislative roles (Clarke & Price 1977).  
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Hence, according to neo-institutionalists, in order to realise change, e.g. descriptive and 
substantive representation of groups like women and ethnic minorities, including MPs with 
such identities will not suffice. Institutions need to change as well. Institutional change is 
however not easily obtained and this is especially the case when existing power relations are 
at stake. Institutions entrench the power relations present at the time of their creation and 
institutionalise the privileged positions of those in power (Thelen & Steinmo 1992). As a 
consequence, institutions also privilege the expression of certain interests over others. 
Feminist research on gender and politics provides abundant proof of the neo-institutionalist 
claim that institutions tend to preserve power relations and privilege the interests of those 
already in power, notably men, and more precisely, heterosexual, highly educated, white, 
middle-aged men (Franceschet 2009).   
As explained in the introduction to this special issue (Rai 2010), institutional norms, shaping 
formal and informal rules, reflect and secure these power relations. Ceremonies, formal and 
informal everyday rituals, in turn put these norms and rules into practice. By their repetitive 
performance, ‘routinised’ rituals re-produce and re-invent power relations on a daily basis. At 
the same time, they make those norms and rules invisible and ‘commonsensical’. The norms 
and rules ‘performed’ through these ceremonies and rituals preserve and reinforce the 
distinction between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ and at the same time sustain a sense of 
belonging amongst the ‘insiders’. Apart from everyday rituals organising social relations in 
parliament in general, parliamentary roles are, in our view, also rituals performing the norms 
and rules concerning representational behaviour. They provide MPs with an institutional 
‘script’ for the ‘right’ representational behaviour, again monitoring the possibilities of 
destabilising power.    
This article deals with the apparent contradiction between, on the one hand, parliaments as 
envisaged by neo-institutionalists as stable and stabilising institutions socialising MPs into 
existing norms and conventions of all sorts, moulding parliamentary behaviour through 
applying existing role patterns and preserving existing power relations, and, on the other 
hand, the societal desire for and political practices aiming at institutional change, i.e. to 
diversify political personnel and open up political decision making processes to include group 
interests that were under-represented in the past. How do the existing norms deal with MPs 
having a ‘different identity’, and vice versa? Do we see a process of norms adapting to the 
‘desired’ situation of diversity in parliament? Does that result in inclusion of the MPs as well 
as of the substantive interests of the group they belong to?  To answer the question whether 
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and to what extent norms have changed to embrace diversity in parliament, we investigate 
everyday rituals, including role behaviour.  
 
1.2. The group representative as a parliamentary role 
Given the request to be more representative, it might be the case that parliaments actually 
have adapted to the presence of MPs with different identities. We hypothesise that in response 
to the demand for more diversity in parliament, a ‘script’ for parliamentary behaviour has 
been installed, notably the parliamentary role of the ‘group representative’ (Celis & Wauters 
2008). In line with our conceptual framework, we suppose that such a ritualistic script for 
representational behaviour by MPs with different identities reflects the extent to which 
parliaments include MPs with different identities and whether/how they affect existing power 
relations.  
Parliamentary roles result from the interplay between institutional frameworks, including both 
formal and informal rules, and individual goals (Searing 1994; Strøm 1997). They can be 
understood as consistent strategies induced by the members’ pursuit of different objectives 
and constrained by the institutional environment. The goals legislators pursue involve both 
career goals and emotional incentives. Parliamentarians are seen as reasonable people 
adapting their emotional incentives to institutional structures and their demands. They adopt 
strategies, i.e. prescriptions as to how parliamentarians may most successfully invest their 
time, media access and voting power, to maximise the likelihood of a preferred outcome 
(reselection, re-election, party office and legislative office). The realisation of each of these 
goals requires a different strategy, and hence the adoption of different roles.  
What attracts us in parliamentary role theory is the interplay between personal preferences 
and the institutional framework resulting in specific representational behaviour. We however 
disagree with Searing that social identity is no longer determining the role of MPs in 
contemporary legislatures. This is firmly contradicted by the literature on women MPs that 
describes a specific type of legislator performing a specific parliamentary role: the MP being 
a member of a group that has been historically discriminated against, who has personal 
preferences with regard to representing the interests of that group and who experiences 
institutional constraints that shape attitudes and actual parliamentary behaviour in pursuing 
that goal. Hence, we could consider the group representative as a parliamentary role given the 
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combination of the goal of an MP to substantively represent their ‘own group’ and the specific 
way in which parliament institutionally structures the behaviour of that MP accordingly.  
The ‘politics of presence’ theory contends that particularly representatives belonging to 
certain disadvantaged groups in society (e.g. women and ethnic minorities) have a specific 
potential to represent the groups they belong to due to shared life experiences and structural 
positions in society (Phillips 1995). These cause a specific background of experiences and 
knowledge that can be tapped into by descriptive representatives; it not only provides 
‘resources’ in terms of consciousness, networks and expertise for the substantive 
representation of women, but also impacts upon their assessment of the priority of and 
engagement in representing women.  
Empirical research reports that institutional features - e.g. numerical under-representation and 
the lack of power positions - often have a negative impact on the desire of women MPs to 
represent women (Franceschet, this volume). In light of the demand for more 
representativeness and diversity in political institutions and decision-making, one might ask 
whether the institutional constraints that hindered group representation in the past actually 
have become institutional facilitators. The number and/or visibility of group members has 
increased, the public increasingly expects them to substantively represent group interests, and 
as a consequence parties might discern an electoral advantage in furthering group 
representation. Hence, one might expect that institutions facilitate the role of the group 
representative, and even push descriptive representatives to represent their groups, regardless 
of their personal goals to do so.  
 
2. Research design and methods  
This article investigates daily rituals including the parliamentary role behaviour of (formerly) 
excluded societal groups – i.e. women, ethnic minorities1 and blue-collar workers - to uncover 
institutional change in norms and rules necessary to meet demands concerning more diversity 
in parliaments. Firstly, it focuses on routinised rituals that organise social relations in 
parliament. Echoing neo-institutionalists, we the hypothesis put forward ise that this analysis 
will show that parliamentary norms are not adapted to nor reflect the representatives’eir 
identities. Next, our analysis focuses on representational performance by exploring the 
concept of the ‘group representative’ as a parliamentary role that establishes a link between 
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being a descriptive representative (i.e. being a member of a disadvantaged societal group) and 
substantive representation (i.e. parliamentary activity in favour of the disadvantaged group). 
At this level of analysis thewe hypothesise is that to a certain extent institutional change has 
taken place, reflecting adaptation to the presence of MPs belonging to disadvantaged societal 
groups. 
The analysis is conducted on the Belgian House of Representatives, the most important 
assembly of the bicameral legislature on the federal Belgian level. In our research we focus on 
MPs from groups whose under-representation has recently been problematised in Belgium: 
women (e.g. Celis & Meier 2006), blue collar workers (e.g. Wauters 2009), and ethnic 
minorities (e.g. Jacobs et al. 2009). For the first group, legislative quotas are in force 
stipulating the proportion of women and men on electoral lists (50/50 since 2002, plus male-
female alternation at the top of the list). The issue of representation of ethnic minorities has 
raised a severe political debate preceding and following the enfranchisement of non-EU 
citizens in 2004. The political representation of blue collar workers on candidate lists was also 
an issue during the last federal elections in 2007. We suppose that these public and political 
debates favour group representation, and that in consequence the Belgian House presents a 
good case study for the prevalence of the ‘group representative’ as a parliamentary role.  
The data were gathered via a focus group interview (conducted Spring 2008) and 11 
individual in-depth interviews (conducted Winter 2009) elaborating insights from the focus 
group interview. Given the limited number of ethnic minority people and blue collar workers 
in the House (respectively five and three), they were all contacted to participate. We selected 
A a number of female MPs were selected, ensuring that both new and long-serving MPs and 
MPs from all political parties (minority and majority) were included in the analysis. Our focus 
group interview was composed of six members of the three selected groups. The joint 
interview setting had the advantage of placing the role of the group representative centre stage 
by giving the possibility for parliamentarians from different groups to compare their situation 
with one another and give feedback on each other’s experiences and insights. Despite the rich 
insights these qualitative methods deliver, it needs to be we acknowledged that our analysis is 
solely based on self-reported data and not on observed parliamentary behaviour.   





3. Research results  
 
3.1 Different identities on the floor 
When asked to tell us speak about formal and informal rituals linked to starting to work in the 
House, introduction to their colleagues in the parliamentary party and to other MPs, and 
regarding everyday contact with colleagues, speech and dress codes, etc. the respondents gave 
usprovided  insights into existing parliamentary norms. Taking the often anecdotal evidence 
together, it became clear that theythese norms  still reflect the life and work style of the kind 
of MP that was and still is numerically dominant: male, highly educated, white, and with a 
partner taking care of their children. 
Working hours are not adapted to people, often women, who are also expected to take care of 
children (Resp. 1) and the official regulations of the House don’t have provisions for 
pregnancy and parental leave (Resp. 3 and 4), which is rather striking given that women MPs 
have worked in the House since 1929. Although women MPs feel that being pregnant is 
accepted, the consequences of having a young child often aren’t. Young mothers get the 
explicit message that the combination of parliamentary work with having a baby will be tough 
“and that puts you in the position of the oddball” (Resp. 3). Absence caused by a sick child is 
accepted, but it nonetheless “undermines your position”; the norm is that the partner takes 
care of the children (Resp. 4).  
The ‘standard MP’ is not only male, he is also upper class, highly educated and especially 
familiarised with juridical jargon and speech.  Two of the working class respondents testify 
that the complex and juridical jargon is a real obstacle for them. It excludes them from full 
and independent participation in parliamentary activities. It nevertheless doesn’t stop them 
from using their own speech style:  
“I went to the parliamentary committee on Business and Economic Law. Twice and 
then never again. I didn’t understand one single word!  There were only jurists using 
legal terms: that’s all double Dutch to me. I speak the language of ordinary people. 
Some ministers find me therefore an oddity and ask me why I do this. But ordinary 
people do at least understand my question, which is not the case for most other 
questions in parliament” (Resp. 5).   
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Clothing and cars also mark the class norm in parliament. The working class MPs all started 
wearing suits. Wearing a costume This is not only expected by colleague MPs their peers, but 
also and foremost by the workers themselves (Resp. 5 and 8):  
“If I were to be on the House’s platform in overalls, I would be seen as folklorean 
oddity  and no-one would take me seriously. Also my former co-workers expect that I 
am smartly dressed because, after all, I am an MP. Although you are seen by the 
workers as one of them, this does not imply that you should be dressed like them” 
(Resp. 8).  
Another MP also had to buy a different car after he was not taken for an MP when he arrived 
in his van and was stopped by the Military Police guarding parliament.  
The appropriate clothing style furthermore reflects the norm of the male and 
autochthonousethnic minority  MP. Women MPs told us that they adapt their clothing style to 
a more official one. It is about “respect for your function, the presence in this important 
building, respect for your voters. Never jeans. It is also a strategy for being taken seriously by 
your colleagues” (Resp. 11). It was also the dominant view that women MPs should refrain 
from a frivolous or revealing dress style because female sexiness and seriousness are 
irreconcilable. This can be interpreted as women anticipating a sexualising gaze not 
acknowledging them to be full MPs. Dressing as an MP also implies not showing your ethnic-
cultural or religious background, like wearing a veil. An Islamic MP explains that showing 
religious identity in that way would cause a fuss and arouse extreme reactions.  Nevertheless, 
she explains, it would not stop her from wearing a veil, for instance in a period of mourning 
or to make a point,
 
although it would certainly hinder her parliamentary activities. The 
ethnocentricity of the standard also becomes clear during work lunches and receptions where 
alcohol and meat are served abundantly. “One People expects you to eat meat, and that you 
drink, and drink a lot. Everything else is seen as strange. If you don’t eat meat for Islamic 
reasons, it becomes rather difficult. Then you often end up eating the decoration, the 
vegetables on the side” (Resp. 4).  
There appears to be a standard profile of an MP that is performed through rituals concerning 
presence, dressing, eating and speaking. Non-compliance results in exclusion, smaller or 
larger hindrances in daily functioning in parliament. But performing the rituals doesn’t 
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guarantee inclusion. Women, ethnic minority and working class MPs stay visible as ‘others’ – 
like colourful butterflies in a grey room. “My face. I look different than the others. It attracts 
attention, in a positive and a negative way” (Resp. 10). Ethnic minority representatives 
especially report this and being a woman of colour seems to amplify that kind of visibility: 
“Belonging to an ethnic minority and being a woman: no need to explain! That is clearly 
visible, at first sight” (Resp. 6). 
This visibility is not power neutral; often women, ethnic minority and working class MPs 
report that it is not taken for granted that they are equally good representatives, and that they 
have to prove they are.  Young women MPs in particular report that they are regarded with 
suspicion. The negative stereotype of being a “babe” (Resp. 9) is seen as an effect of the quota 
for women. But the working class and ethnic minority male MPs were also confronted with 
the stereotype of being there because of the wish of their party to be more representative and 
not because of their own expertise and capacities. Young women MPs tell anecdotes about 
how they were taken to be the secretary, a staff member, the group leader on missions abroad, 
in the wrong room because it was the military committee meeting or being asked where the 
committee’s chair was when they were actually the chair (Resp. 2; Resp. 9).  
In reaction to these stereotypes, most of the respondents put extra effort into proving that they 
are up for the job. They consider that they have succeeded when their colleagues no longer 
see them as an MP with a different identity, but as a mainstream MP. A young, woman MP 
belonging to an ethnic minority, who is also leader of a parliamentary party, said:  
“In the beginning they said ‘oh yes, the only woman…’ and ‘oh yes, the only person 
from an ethnic minority…’. Now it is more ‘oh, what is she going to say?’ That is 
cool. In the beginning they saw me only as the ‘alibi Ali’. I wanted to prove the 
opposite and I succeeded. That’s my way to fight back. It still drives me.”  
It is clear that MPs with identity features that differ from the standard are confronted with 
prejudices related to their identities. These do affect the functioning of ‘different’ MPs as 
representatives, in that they have to invest in proving that they are ‘equally good’. But no 
respondent reported that they couldn’t manage to do so. It is nevertheless striking that success 
in that respect – notably, being included in the ‘insider group’ - is defined by the respondents 
as making their own identity features invisible, and not for instance, as giving them a positive 
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connotation. Adapting to the norms, thereby decreasing diversity, seems to be a far more 
dominant approach than adapting those norms to the existing diversity in parliament.  
 
3.2. Identity and substantive representation: the role of the group representative 
 
3.2.1 Individual preferences 
Our respondents confirm the ‘politics of presence’ theory. Most descriptive representatives 
have the desire to behave as a representative of the interests of their social group and are 
convinced that they have specific capacities to do so:  
“I am persuaded that having representatives from certain social groups in parliament 
can be beneficial. I used to get annoyed by politicians talking about an ethnic minority 
topic without having any contact with ethnic minorities. Having these contacts 
provides an extra intellectual ‘baggage’, it gives you a step ahead: you can speak about 
this group from a broader point of view” (Resp. F 1).   
Particularly in the first years in parliament they see it as their duty to spend considerable 
attention on the interests of their social group. As a parliamentarian with a past as a blue 
collar worker said: “When I first entered parliament, I had great ambitions: I wanted to defend 
the interests of my supporters, namely the dock workers” (Resp. F 3). This sense of duty 
seems to be stronger for social groups that are not numerous in parliament (blue collar 
workers and ethnic minorities in this analysis): “I do not defend intentionally women’s 
interests (…). But as an ethnic minority MP, I see it as my mission to defend their interests, 
because there are only four or five of us here” (Resp. 3). At the same time, the low number of 
MPs with a migratory or visible-minority background might also make it more difficult to 
represent ethnic minority interests: “Defending ethnic minority interests is more difficult. The 
public support is lower, there is left-right divide, the presence of extreme right parties and 
there are anyhow fewer people from ethnic minorities that make their voice heard” (Resp. 4).  
However, the parliamentarians also stress that their presence is not a necessary condition for 
the representation of interests. There are, for instance, occupational categories who do not 
Opmerking [s1]: I am not sure what 
this denotes? First usage – could you 
explain please or remove for consistency?  
Opmerking [s2]: Ditto as above. Could 
check for others as well eg. On p. 13 
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have descriptive representatives in parliament, but whose interests are nevertheless tackled in 
parliament. It is not a necessary condition, but it can provide an added value in terms of 
representation:  
“I can’t imagine that when it is pointed out to the leader of our parliamentary party 
that there is a specific problem with ethnic minorities that he will not occupy himself 
with that problem, but probably I am more engaged with it, because I do understand it 
better, I come out of that community, I was brought up there and I am still in the midst 
of that community” (Resp. 6).  
 
3.2.2 Institutions and expectations 
Apart from their own desire to represent their groups in parliament, most respondents 
experienced implicit and explicit expectations from their political party, individuals, 
organisations, and/or the general public to act as the representative of their social group. 
Firstly, most respondents acknowledged that they are put forward by their political party as a 
candidate because of identity features, and sometimes even a specific combination of 
identities: “There were still some positions open on the candidate list. They had designated a 
specific profile for one of them: young, woman and belonging to an ethnic minority 
(preferably united in one person). They wanted that profile because they would like to have a 
more diverse representation. (…) Finally, they ended up with me” (Resp. 3). The party 
assumed that these groups constitute a significant share of the electorate and by presenting 
candidates from that social group they hoped to turn these candidatures to their electoral 
advantage. Becoming a candidate is the result of the interplay between, on the one hand, the 
demand of a political party to have members of social groups on their candidate lists and, on 
the other hand, a supply of these members who have ambitions to defend the interests of their 
group. This interplay was mentioned by several MPs.  
Once in parliament, our respondents encountered expectations from the party to act in the 
interest of their group (as long as this matches with the party policy). Some respondents 
mention pressure from the parliamentary party to become a member of specific parliamentary 
committees, to take up certain policy issues concerning their social group or to act as 
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spokesperson in a workshop that deals with, for instance, integration or dockworkers. One 
respondent even mentioned a control system amongst ethnic minority MPs in the Brussels 
parliament:  
“There were many ethnic minority MPs in the Brussels parliament. Together we have 
set up some sort of self-control mechanism. If there was a topic related to ethnic 
minorities, the voting behaviour of other ethnic minority MPs was closely monitored. 
If there was one MP who had not taken a clear and straightforward stance in favour of 
ethnic minorities, this was communicated to journalists and he was publicly 
condemned by the other ethnic minority MPs” (Resp. 10). 
Secondly, MPs also experience such expectations ‘from below’: “During my first years in 
parliament, I combined my parliamentary mandate with a professional occupation as a 
dockworker. This created a strong linkage with my social group. Every other day, my 
colleague dockworkers used to ask me: ‘what did you do for us in parliament yesterday?’” 
(Resp. F 3). Unsurprisingly, civil society groups defending the interests of a particular social 
group also aim to influence the parliamentary behaviour of ‘their’ descriptive representatives, 
who in turn are keen on maintaining good contacts with these organisations. However, the 
fact that they experience pressure to behave as representatives of these organisations does not 
mean that they necessarily adapt their behaviour.  
Thirdly, MPs belonging to under-represented groups sense the implicit expectation of the 
general public for them to act in the interests of their social group:  
“The general public opinion expects that I will take positions in the interest of ethnic 
minorities. This is a very remarkable phenomenon. It seems self-evident for a lot of 
people that because I have an unfamiliar name, and because I have a link with that 
group, that I will represent them. I heard many of these statements shortly after my 
entrance in parliament” (Resp. F 1).  
And last but not least, the media also often approach descriptive representatives as 
spokespersons for their social group:  
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“I receive more media attention when I raise topics related to ethnic minorities 
compared to more general topics. And if the topic of the day is about ethnic minorities, 
the media always manage to find me. If the media need me, it is always about that 
kind of topic (…). During my pregnancy leave, there was some controversy about 
naturalisations. I had messages from more than ten journalists in my mailbox, while 
there were two other parliamentarians from my party in that parliamentary committee, 
but they of course do not belong to an ethnic minority” (Resp. 3).    
We expected ethnic minority MPs to have more and stronger preferences and incentives to 
defend their group than women and blue collar workers. Ethnic minorities are more visible 
and contested in modern society and their numbers in parliament are low, while women MPs 
are more numerous and a blue collar identity tends to dilute once in parliament. We obtain, 
however, mixed evidence: some ethnic minority MPs declare that they see it as their duty to 
represent their group, while other ethnic minority MPs indicate that it is more difficult to 
represent these interests. 
 
3.2.3. More than a group representative 
Notwithstanding that the personal goals of many of our respondents consist of representing 
their groups, the belief that their identity is an added value in that respect and the fit between 
goals and institutional expectations, most respondents stress their aspiration to be(come) more 
than a group representative. They claim the right to (and actually do) refuse to perform the 
role of the group representative as their only parliamentary ‘raison d’être’ and do not want to 
be the spokesperson for women’s, blue collar workers’ or ethnic minorities’ interests only. 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that MPs from socially disadvantaged groups are not willing 
to take on the role of group representative at all (rather on the contrary: see above). Besides 
some attention for their social group, they want to be included in the group of ‘mainstream 
parliamentarians’, working on general topics. They are proud to be colourful butterflies, and 
sometimes they also act as butterflies, but they don’t want to be the outsider.   
This can at least partially be explained by a rational strategy of the representatives. Although 
some of the respondents do inform organisations and members of their social group about 
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their representative activities with the goal of securing or acquiring votes, most respondents 
do not believe that being a member of a social group and having acted in the interest of that 
group in parliament constitute significant advantages in the selection process controlled by the 
party, nor in the elections. Due to the enlargement of the electoral districts, the concentration 
of a social group in the electoral district is considered to be too small to convince the party 
that as a group representative they deserve a place on top of the list. Criteria used by the 
‘selectorate’ and by the voters refer in the first place to capabilities and to general functioning 
in and outside parliament, and only to a far lesser extent to the representation of group 
interests.  
The most important reason for resisting the role of the group representative is however the 
fear of being reduced to a parliamentary role that is seen as marginal and low status. The 
group representative is not considered to be a fully-fledged parliamentarian by most women, 
blue collar and ethnic minority MPs themselves. A female MP with an ethnic minority 
background explains:  
“I do not want to occupy myself solely with diversity, asylum and migration. On the 
contrary, I want to keep off them as much as possible. It is not that I am not interested in 
these topics, but if I would only deal with these topics, they keep sticking on me forever. I 
want to be more than that (…) Because I focus on other topics, people can no longer lock 
me up in a mental image based on my physical and cultural ethnic background and my 
gender (…) The only way to remove that is to become involved in general topics, 
otherwise you always will be placed in the same pigeon-hole” (Resp. 4).  
 
4. Conclusion  
This article has dealt with an issue of importance to many Western democracies: the tension 
between the societal and political desire to be more inclusive and diverse on the one hand, 
and, on the other hand, political institutions that, according to neo-institutionalist scholars, 
tend to preserve norms favouring the dominant group. To gain insight into these norms our 
research focused on everyday rituals organising social relations and on the performance of the 
representative role of the group representative. Our main conclusion is that existing norms in 
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the Belgian House are stronger and more resistant to change than increased attention for the 
political representation of women, blue collar workers and ethnic minorities would have 
suggested. In general, MPs from these groups are more likely to adapt themselves instead of 
parliamentary norms being changed to acknowledge and embrace diversity. For instance, 
fighting prejudices about their lesser capacities leads to compliance with the existing norms of 
how MPs should behave and perform, not to a positive recognition of difference. Hence, 
inclusion as full MPs results in erasing difference and preserving the existing norms and 
power status quo.  
At the level of substantive representation, on the contrary, we might have provided proof of 
institutional change, at least to some degree. By installing the role of the group representative, 
the Belgian House allows for and even supports members of societal groups to realise their 
ambition to represent their interests, a role for which they believe to possess specific qualities. 
Nevertheless, this role is not considered to be powerful or to increase chances for selection 
and election. Performing it does not result in full inclusion as an insider. This results in MPs’ 
personal strategies that aim at (simultaneous) recognition as a mainstream, generalist MP. 
Applied to the parliamentary role theory: MPs with a specific identity have personal 
preferences to represent their particular group and are encouraged to behave as a group 
representative by institutions such as parties, organisations and the general public. However, 
since MPs estimate that this behaviour is not compatible with their career goals, i.e. being a 
mainstream MP securing re-election, they often hesitate and even refrain from taking up the 
role of group representative. 
Hence, our conclusion regarding the substantive representation of societal groups echoes the 
one concerning norms and habits in parliament: the role of the group representative cannot be 
seen as a sign of parliament truly and positively embracing diversity. Moreover, it might even 
be interpreted as an institutional strategy to address the request regarding diversity and 
inclusiveness but at the same time preserving existing power relations by limiting their impact 
on parliamentary work and the political agenda. From the part of the MPs this results in 
balancing between being that colourful butterfly, but making sure not to be pinned down as 
one.  
 
Opmerking [s3]: Could you please have 
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  An ethnic minority person has a minority ethnic-cultural family background; (s)he might have the Belgian 
nationality or not. In Belgium the two most dominant allochthonous groups are Moroccans and Turks (Jacobs 
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Appendix 1: Participants in the focus group  
 




Number of parliamentary 
terms (the current one 
included) 
Respondent F1 E + W Govt 1 
Respondent F2 B Opp 1 
Respondent F3 B Opp 4 
Respondent F4 W Opp 1 
Respondent F5 W Govt 3 
Respondent F6 W Govt 1 




Appendix 2: Participants in the individual interview round 
 




Number of parliamentary 
terms (the current one 
included) 
Respondent 1 W Govt 4 
Respondent 2 W Govt 1 
Respondent 3* W + E Govt 1 
Respondent 4 W + E Opp 1 
Respondent 5* B Opp 1 
Respondent 6 W + E + B Opp 1 
Respondent 7 W Opp 1 
Respondent 8* B Opp 4 
Respondent 9 W Govt 2 
Respondent 10 E Opp 1 
Respondent 11 W Govt 1 
E = Ethnic minority; W = Women ; B = Blue collar worker 
* = did also participate in focus group 
 
